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Abstract
We build an agent-based model for the order book with three types of market participants:
informed trader, noise trader and competitive market makers. Using a Glosten-Milgrom
like approach, we are able to deduce the whole limit order book (bid-ask spread and
volume available at each price) from the interactions between the different agents. More
precisely, we obtain a link between efficient price dynamic, proportion of trades due to
the noise trader, traded volume, bid-ask spread and equilibrium limit order book state.
With this model, we provide a relevant tool for regulators and market platforms. We
show for example that it allows us to forecast consequences of a tick size change on the
microstructure of an asset. It also enables us to value quantitatively the queue position
of a limit order in the book.
Keywords: Market microstructure, limit order book, bid-ask spread, adverse selection, fi-
nancial regulation, tick size, queue position valuation.
1 Introduction
Limit order book (LOB) modeling has become an important research topic in quantitative
finance. This is because market participants and regulators need to use LOB models for
many different tasks such as optimizing trading tactics, assessing the quality of the various
algorithms operating on the markets, understanding the behaviors of market participants and
their impact on the price formation process or designing new regulations at the microstruc-
ture level. In the literature, there are two main ways to model the LOB: statistical and
equilibrium models. In statistical models, agents order flows follow suitable stochastic pro-
cesses. In this type of approach, the goal is to reproduce important market stylized facts
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and to be useful in practice, enabling practitioners to compute relevant quantities such as
trading costs, market impact or execution probabilities. Most statistical models are so-called
zero-intelligence models because order flows are driven by independent Poisson processes, see
for example [1, 7, 8, 23, 31]. This assumption is relaxed in [5, 17, 19] where more realistic
dynamics are obtained introducing dependencies between the state of the order book and the
behavior of market participants.
In equilibrium models, see for instance [10, 11, 28, 30], LOB dynamics arise from interac-
tions between rational agents acting optimally: the agents choose their trading decisions as
solutions of individual utility maximization problems. For example in [28], the author investi-
gates a simple model where traders choose the type of order to submit (market or limit order)
according to market conditions, and taking into account the fact that their decisions can
influence other traders. In this framework, it becomes possible to analyze accurately market
equilibriums. However, the spread is exogenous and there is no asymmetric information on
the fundamental value of the asset so that no adverse selection effect is considered. This is
the case in the order-driven model of [30] too, where traders can also choose between market
and limit orders. In this approach, all information is common knowledge and the waiting
costs are the driving force. This model leads to several very relevant predictions about the
links between trading flows, market impact and LOB shape.
In this paper, we introduce an equilibrium-type model. It is a simple agent-based model for
the order book where we consider three types of market participants like in [22]: an informed
trader, a noise trader and market makers. The informed trader receives market information
such as the jumps of the efficient price, which is hidden to the noise trader. He then takes
advantage of this information to gain profit by sending market orders. Market makers also
receive the same information but with some delay and they place limit orders as long as the
expected gain of these orders is positive (they are assumed to be risk-neutral). The informed
trader and market makers represent the strategic part in the trading activity, while the ran-
dom part consists in the noise trader who is assumed to send market orders according to a
compound Poisson process.
Interestingly, the above simple framework allows us to deduce a link between efficient price
dynamic, proportion of trades due to the noise trader, traded volume, bid-ask spread and
equilibrium state for the LOB. It enables us to derive the whole order book shape (bid-ask
spread and volume present at each price) from the interactions between the agents. The ques-
tion of how the bid-ask spread emerges from the behavior of market participants has been
discussed in many works. It is generally accepted that the bid-ask spread is non-zero because
of the existence of three types of costs: order processing costs, see [16, 30], inventory costs,
see [14, 33], and adverse selection costs, see [11]. In the already mentioned paper [30], the
spread is a consequence of order processing costs: to compensate their waiting costs, traders
place their limit orders on different price levels (for example, a sell limit order at a higher
level gets a better expected price than one at a lower level but needs longer time to be ex-
ecuted. Thus the case where both orders lead to the same expected utility can be considered).
In contrast, our model is inspired by [11]. Liquidity is offered by market makers only and they
face an adverse selection issue since a participant agreeing to trade at the market maker’s ask
or bid price may be trading because he is informed. Order processing and inventory costs are
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neglected and we consider the bid-ask spread as a purely informational phenomenon: limit
orders are placed at different levels because liquidity providers must protect themselves from
traders with superior information. In this framework, in a very similar way as in [11], the
bid-ask spread emerges naturally from the fact that limit orders placed too close to the effi-
cient price have negative expected returns when being executed: the presence of the informed
trader and the potential large jumps of the efficient price prevent market makers from placing
limit orders too close to the efficient price. We also find that the bid-ask spread turns out
to be the sum of the tick value and of the intrinsic bid-ask spread, which corresponds to a
hypothetical value of the bid-ask spread under infinitesimal tick size.
Let us emphasize that several models study the LOB assuming the presence of our three types
of market participants and imposing, as we will do, a zero-profit type condition stating that
limit orders can only be placed in the LOB if their expected return relative to the efficient
price is non-negative. For instance, the papers [11] and [4] share multiple similarities with
ours. Compared with [11], there are two main differences. First, in [11], the zero-profit as-
sumption applies only to the two best offer limits: the bid and ask prices at each trade are
set to yield zero-profit to the market maker, and time priority plays no role. In our model, we
propose a generalized version of the zero-profit condition under which fast market makers can
still make profits because of time priority. Second, in [11], one assumes that only unit trades
can occur, which is quite restrictive. In our model we relax this assumption, which allows us
to retrieve the whole LOB shape and not only the bid-ask spread. In addition to this, we
also treat the case where the tick size is non-zero, whereas it is assumed to be vanishing in [11].
In [4], the authors investigate the consequences of a zero-profit condition at the level of the
whole liquidity supply curve provided by each market maker. This is an intricate situation
where standard equilibriums cannot be reached since a profitable deviation (from a Nash
equilibrium) for any market maker is to offer the shares at a slightly higher price as explained
in [6]. In this work, we rather assume that when a market maker computes his expected
profit, he takes into consideration the orders submitted by other market makers. This is done
so that the zero-profit condition holds only for the last order of each queue in the LOB. It
in particular means that a market maker can still make positive profit. This enables us to
obtain a very operational and tractable framework, where we can deduce the whole LOB
shape, compute various important quantities such as priority values of limit orders, and make
predictions about consequences of regulatory changes, for example on the tick size.
Note that an important point in our model is that we also consider the case where the tick
size is non-zero. This allows us to analyze its role in the LOB dynamic. For instance, we
derive a new and very useful relationship between the tick size and the spread. We validate
this relationship on market data and show how to use it for regulatory purposes, in particular
to forecast new spread values after tick size changes.
The discreteness of available price levels also enables us to value in a quantitative way the
queue position of limit orders. LOBs use a priority system for limit orders submitted at the
same price. Several priority rules can be employed such as price-time priority or price-size
priority, see [12]. We consider here the widely used price-time mechanism which gives priority
to the limit orders in a first in first out way. Therefore it encourages traders to submit limit
orders early. Our model is one of the only approaches allowing to quantify with accuracy the
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advantage of being at the top of the queue compared to being at its end. A notable exception
is the paper [27]. In this work, the authors value queue positions at the best levels for large
tick assets in a queuing model taking into account price impact and some adverse selection.
In our setting, we are able to compute the effects of the strategic interactions between market
participants on queue position valuation. Furthermore, we are not restricted to the best levels
of large tick assets. However, as will be seen in our empirical results, our findings are in line
with those of [27].
Other well-known stylized facts are reproduced in our model. For instance, when the absolute
value of the efficient price jumps follows a Pareto distribution, we retrieve the classical linear
relationship between spread and volatility per trade proved in [25], see also [33]. This will be
particularly helpful to calibrate our model so that one can use it as a market simulator for
analyzing regulatory measures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our agent-based LOB model
with zero tick value. Based on a greedy assumption for the informed trader’s behavior, a
link is deduced between traded volume, efficient price jump distribution and LOB shape. We
then add the zero-profit condition for market makers, which enables us to compute explicitly
the bid-ask spread as well as the LOB shape. In Section 3, the case of non-zero tick value
is considered. We show that the bid-ask spread is in fact equal to the sum of the intrinsic
bid-ask spread (without the tick value constraint) and the tick value. The LOB shape under
positive tick size is also deduced and we give an explicit formula for the value of the queue
position of a limit order. In Section 4, based on the results of the model, we make the exercise
of forecasting new spread values for the CAC 40 assets whose tick sizes have changed due to
the new MiFID II regulation. Section 5 is devoted to the calibration of the model and the
computation of queue position values for small tick assets of the CAC 40 index. Finally, the
proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Model and assumptions
In our model, we assume the existence of an efficient price modeled by a compound Poisson
process and the presence of three different types of market participants: an informed trader,
a noise trader and several market makers. In our approach, market makers choose their bid-
ask quotes by computing the expected gain of potential limit orders at various price levels.
This is done in a context of asymmetric information between the informed and the noise
trader regarding the efficient price (the efficient price is actually used as a tool to materialize
asymmetry of information). This framework enables us to obtain explicit formulas for the
spread, LOB shape and variance per trade. These quantities essentially depend on the law of
the efficient price jumps, the distribution of the noise trader’s orders size, and the number of
price jumps compared to that of orders sent by the noise trader. Note that contrary to most
LOB models which deal only with the dynamics at the best bid/ask limits, or assume that
the spread is constant, see for example [7], our model allows for spread variations and applies
to the whole LOB shape. We present in this section the case where the tick size is assumed
to be equal to zero. The obtained results will help us to understand those in Section 3 where
we consider a positive tick size.
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2.1 Modeling the efficient price
We write P (t) for the market underlying efficient price, whose dynamic is described as follows:
P (t) = P0 + Y (t),
where Y (t) =
∑Nt
j=1Bj is a compound Poisson process and P0 > 0. Here {Nt : t ≥ 0} is a
Poisson process with intensity λi > 0, and the {Bj : j ≥ 1} are independent and identically
distributed square integrable random variables with positive symmetric density fψ on R and
cumulative distribution function Fψ. Hence we consider that new information arrives on the
market at discrete times given by a Poisson process with intensity λi. So we assume that at
the jth information arrival time, the efficient price P (t) is modified by a jump of random size
Bj .
Furthermore, since E[Bj ] = 0, we have that P (t) is a martingale. Thus E[P (t)] = P0 and
Var[P (t)] = λitE[B2j ]. We view λiE[B2j ] as the macroscopic volatility of our asset. In the
sequel, for sake of simplicity, we write B for Bj when no confusion is possible.
2.2 Market participants
We assume that there are three types of market participants:
• One informed trader: by this term, we mean a trader who undergoes low latency and is
able to access market data and assess efficient price jumps faster than other participants,
creating asymmetric information in the market. For instance, he can analyze external
information or use lead-lag relationships between assets or platforms to evaluate the
efficient price (for details about lead-lag see [13, 15, 20]). Therefore, we assume that
the informed trader receives the value of the price jump size B (and the efficient price
P (t)) just before it happens. He then sends his trades based on this information to gain
profit. He does not send orders at other times than those of price jumps and we write
Qi for his order size that will be strategically chosen later. Note that he may not send
orders at a price jump time if he considers such action would not be profitable.
• One noise trader: he sends market orders in a zero-intelligence random fashion. We
assume that these trades follow a compound Poisson process with intensity λu. We
denote by {Quj : j ≥ 1} the noise trader’s order sizes which are independent and
identically distributed integrable random variables. We write fκu for the density of the
Quj which is positive and symmetric on R (a positive volume represents a buy order,
while a negative volume represents a sell order) and Fκu for their cumulative distribution
function. Remark that r = λ
i
λi+λu
corresponds to the average proportion of price jumps
compared to the total number of events happening on the market (efficient price jumps
and trades by the noise trader). Recall that informed trades can occur only when there
is a price jump. We will assume throughout the paper that r > 0. We denote by Q the
order size independently of the issuer of the order (noise or informed trader).
• Market makers: they receive the value of the price jump size B (and the efficient price
P (t)) right after it happens. We assume that they are risk neutral. In practice, market
makers are often high frequency traders and considered informed too. However, contrary
to our notion of informed trader, their analyses typically rely on order flows (notably
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through spread and imbalance) to extract the efficient price rather than on external
information. This is because directional trading is not at the core of market making
algorithms. We consider like in [11] that market makers know the proportion of price
jumps compared to the total number of events happening on the market, that they
compete with each others, and that they are free to modify their limit orders at any
time after a price jump or a transaction. Market makers place their orders according to
their potential profit and loss with respect to the efficient price (no inventory aspects
are considered here). Thus they only send sell orders at price levels above the efficient
price and buy orders at price levels below it.
We assume here that there is no tick size (this assumption will be relaxed in Section 3). The
LOB is made of limit orders placed by market makers around the efficient price P (t). We
denote the cumulative available liquidity between P (t) and P (t)+x by L(x)1. When L(x) ≥ 0
(resp. L(x) ≤ 0), it represents the total volume of sell (resp. buy) limit orders with price
smaller (resp. larger) than or equal to P (t) + x. This function L is called cumulative LOB
shape function.
2.3 Assumptions
We do not impose any condition on the cumulative LOB shape function L which can have a
singular part and discontinuities. We define its inverse L−1 by:
L−1(q) = argmin
x
{x|L(x) ≥ q}.
Given the function L, we now specify the behavior of the informed trader in the next as-
sumption. This assumption relates the traded volume of the informed trader Qi to the LOB
cumulative shape L and the size of the price jump B received by the informed trader.
Assumption 1. Let t be a jump time of the efficient price. Based on the received value B
and the cumulative LOB shape function L provided by market makers, the informed trader
sends his trades in a greedy way such that he wipes out all the available liquidity in the LOB
until level P (t) +B. Thus, his trade size Qi satisfies:
Qi = L(B−).
The informed trader computes his gain according to the future efficient price. If he knows that
the price will increase (resp. decrease), which corresponds to a positive (resp. negative) jump
B, he consumes all the sell (resp. buy) orders leading to positive ex-post profit. In both cases,
his profit is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the future efficient price and
the price per share at which he bought or sold, multiplied by the consumed quantity. Note
that in the spirit of this work, the informed trader does not accumulate position intraday.
What we have in mind is that he unwinds his position passively. As an illustration, if at a
given moment the efficient price is equal to 10 euros and the future price jump is equal to 0.05
euros, the informed trader consumes all the sell orders at prices between 10 and 10.05 euros.
He then can potentially unwind his position by submitting passive sell orders at a price equal
to or higher than the new efficient price. Knowing that their latent profit is computed with
respect to the efficient price, he can afford submitting them close to the new efficient price,
thereby making their execution very likely.
1This quantity actually depends on time t but for sake of simplicity, we just write L(x).
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Remark 2.1. For a given order of size Qi initiated by the informed trader and for a given
quantity q, the probability that the trade size Qi is less than q satisfies:
P[Qi < q] = P[L(B−) < q]
= P[B < L−1(q)]
= Fψ(L
−1(q)).
In the following, our goal is to compute the spread and LOB shape. We proceed in two steps.
First, we derive the expected gain of potential limit orders of the market makers. Second, we
consider a zero-profit assumption for market makers (due to competition). Based on these
two ingredients, we show how the spread and LOB shape emerge.
2.4 Computation of the market makers expected gain
This part is the first step of our approach. We focus here on the gain of passive sell orders.
The gain of passive buy orders can be readily deduced the same way.
Let L be the shape of the order book. Our goal is to compute the conditional average profit
of a new infinitesimal order if submitted at price level x knowing that Q > L(x) and without
any information about the trade’s initiator. We write G(x) for this quantity2.
We consider the profit of new orders with total volume ε > 0, placed between P (t)+x−δp and
P (t)+x for some x > 0 and δp > 0, given the fact that these orders are totally executed. The
volume ε submitted orders are represented by an additional cumulative LOB shape function
denoted by L˜(x). Note that we work with orders submitted between x − δp and x to take
into account two cases: L(x) is continuous at x and L(x) has a mass at x. The function L˜(x)
is defined as follows:
• For s < x− δp, L˜(s) = 0 and the liquidity available in the LOB up to s is equal to L(s).
• For x − δp ≤ s ≤ x, the available liquidity is L(s) + L˜(s), where L˜(x − δp) = 0 and
L˜(x) = ε.
• For s ≥ x, the liquidity available in the LOB up to s is equal to L(s) + ε.
Furthermore, we assume that for any s < x, L˜(s) < ε. Let us write:
• ν for a random variable that is equal to 1 if the trade is initiated by the informed trader
and 0 if it is initiated by the noise trader.
• Gnoise(x−δp, x) for the gain of new orders with total volume ε submitted between x−δp
and x in case the trade is initiated by the noise trader knowing that Qu ≥ L(x) + L˜(x).
• Ginf (x− δp, x) for the gain of new orders with total volume ε submitted between x− δp
and x in case the trade is initiated by the informed trader knowing thatQi ≥ L(x)+L˜(x).
• G(x − δp, x) for the expected conditional gain of new orders with total volume ε sub-
mitted between x − δp and x knowing that Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x) without any information
about the trade’s initiator.
2Note that the gain depends on time t but we keep the notation G(x) when no confusion is possible.
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The quantity G(x− δp, x) is equal to:
Ginf (x− δp, x)P[ν = 1|Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)] +Gnoise(x− δp, x)P[ν = 0|Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)].
Our aim being to compute the expected gain of a new infinitesimal order if submitted at price
level x, we make δp and ε tend to 0. Thus we define
G(x) = lim
ε→0
(
lim
δp→0
G(x− δp, x)
ε
)
.
We have the following proposition proved in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.1. For x ≥ 0, the average profit of a new infinitesimal order if submitted at
price level x satisfies:
G(x) = x− rE[B1B>x]
rP[B > x] + (1− r)P[Qu > L(x)]
and for x ≤ 0
G(x) = −x+ rE[B1B<x]
rP[B < x] + (1− r)P[Qu < L(x)] .
Remark that the average profit G(x) above is well defined even when L(x) = 0. In fact, when
L(x)=0, G(x) represents the expected gain of an infinitesimal order submitted in an empty
order book at x. Note that for a given x, when L(x) goes large, the expected gain of the limit
orders becomes negative.
We now describe the way the LOB is built via a zero-profit type condition. Let us take the ask
side of the LOB. For any point x, market makers first consider whether or not there should be
liquidity between 0 and x. To do so, they compute the value Lˆ(x) which is so that we obtain
G(x) = 0 in the expression in Proposition 2.1. If Lˆ(x) is positive, then competition between
market makers takes place and the cumulative order book adjusts so that L(x) = Lˆ(x) in
order to obtain G(x) = 0. If Lˆ(x) = 0, then there is no liquidity between 0 and x. If Lˆ(x)
is negative, we deduce that there is no liquidity between 0 and x since this liquidity should
be positive. This mechanism makes sense since, as we will see in what follows, Lˆ(x) is a non-
decreasing function of x, which implies two things. First, it is impossible to come across a
situation where x1 < x2 and where market makers are supposed to add liquidity between P (t)
and P (t) + x1 but not between P (t) and P (t) + x2. Second, the cumulative shape function
for the LOB is indeed non-decreasing.
We have that G(x) = 0 is equivalent to:
x =

rE[B1B>x]
rP[B>x]+(1−r)P[Qu>Lˆ(x)] if x ≥ 0
rE[B1B<x]
rP[B<x]+(1−r)P[Qu<Lˆ(x)] if x ≤ 0.
This implies:
Lˆ(x) =
{
F−1κu
(
1
1−r − r1−rE[max(Bx , 1)]
)
if x ≥ 0
F−1κu
( −r
1−r +
r
1−rE[max(
B
x , 1)]
)
if x ≤ 0.
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The details of the computation of Lˆ(x) are given in Appendix A.2.
We formalize now the zero-profit assumption introduced above. It is the second step of our
approach in order to eventually compute the spread and LOB shape.
Assumption 2. For every x > 0 (resp. x < 0), market makers compute Lˆ(x). If Lˆ(x) ≤ 0
(resp. Lˆ(x) ≥ 0), market makers add no liquidity to the LOB: L(x) = 0. If Lˆ(x) > 0 (resp.
Lˆ(x) < 0), because of competition, the cumulative order book adjusts so that G(x) = 0. We
then obtain L(x) = Lˆ(x).
The above zero-profit assumption can be seen as a generalized version of the zero-profit con-
dition proposed in [11], in which zero-profit is only considered for the two best offer limits. It
is also interesting to point out that, under this more realistic setting, those very fast market
makers can still make profit as their orders are placed earlier in the LOB.
In this case where the tick size is zero, it can seem difficult to imagine how competition between
different market makers takes place. One can think that every market maker specifies his own
L(x) (cumulative liquidity that he provides). Then Assumption 2 means that, when there is
still room for future profit at x (G(x) > 0), other market makers will come to the market and
increase the liquidity in the LOB until G(x) becomes null. Note again that we consider here
that market makers can insert infinitesimal quantities in the LOB. These ideas will be made
clearer in Section 3 where the tick size is no longer zero.
2.5 The emergence of the bid-ask spread and LOB shape
Based on the expected gain of the market makers, see Proposition 2.1, and the zero-profit
condition (Assumption 2), we can derive the bid-ask spread and LOB shape. We have the
following theorem proved in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2.1. The cumulative LOB shape satisfies L(x) = −L(−x) for any x ∈ R, L(x) = 0
for x ∈ [−µ, µ] and L is continuous strictly increasing for x > µ, where µ is the unique solution
of the following equation:
1 + r
2r
= E[max(
B
µ
, 1)]. (1)
For x > µ, L(x) > 0 and
L(x) = F−1κu
( 1
1− r −
r
1− rE[max(
B
x
, 1)]
)
. (2)
For x < −µ, L(x) < 0 and
L(x) = F−1κu
( −r
1− r +
r
1− rE[max(
B
x
, 1)]
)
. (3)
In particular, the bid-ask spread is equal to 2µ.
Equation (1) shows that the spread is an increasing function of r. This means that market
makers are aware of the adverse selection they risk when the number of price jumps increases.
As a consequence, they enlarge the spread in order to avoid this effect due to the trades issued
by the informed trader just before the price jumps take place. In particular, if there is no
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noise trader in the market, then r = 1 and the spread tends to infinity. On the contrary,
when the number of trades from the noise trader increases, market makers reduce the spread
because they are less subject to adverse selection. All these results are consistent with the
findings in [11].
Equations (2) and (3) show that the liquidity submitted by the market makers is a decreasing
function of r. Indeed let us take x > µ and define h(r) = 11−r − r1−rE[max(Bx , 1)]. We have
∂h
∂r
(r) =
1− E[max(Bx , 1)]
(1− r)2 ≤ 0.
This means that h is a decreasing function of r. The function F−1κu being increasing, we deduce
that L(x) is a decreasing function of r. When the number of price jumps increases, market
makers reduce the quantity of submitted passive orders. In contrast, when the number of
trades from the noise trader is large, the market becomes very liquid. This is in line with the
empirical results in [26] where it is shown that just before certain announcements, in order
to avoid adverse selection, market makers reduce their depth and increase their spread.
Finally, we recall that in our setting, we do not a priori impose any condition on L(x).
Equations (1), (2) and (3) show that the cumulative LOB we obtain is continuous and strictly
increasing beyond the spread. Remark also that L(x) tends to infinity as x goes to infinity.
This implies that the noise trader can always find liquidity in the LOB, whatever the size of
his market order.
2.6 Variance per trade
The variance per trade is the variance of an increment of efficient price between two transac-
tions. It can be viewed as the ratio between the cumulated variance and the number of trades
over the considered period. A lot of interest has been devoted to this notion in the literature,
notably because of its connection with the spread and the uncertainty zone parameter η, see
[9, 25, 33].
In this work, this quantity will moreover help us estimate the law of the efficient price.
Denote by τi the time of the i
th trade and by Pτi the value of the efficient price right after
this transaction. We have the following result proved in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 2.2. The variance per trade σ2tr satisfies:
σ2tr = E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2] =
E[B2]µ
E[|B|1|B|>µ]
.
We know that for small tick assets, we should obtain a linear relationship between the volatility
per trade and the spread, with a slope coefficient between 1 and 2, see [25, 33]. If we consider
such asset, we must then have:
E[B2]
E[|B|1|B|>µ]
∼ µ.
A classical choice, enabling us to satisfy the above relationship is to consider a Pareto distri-
bution for the absolute value of the efficient price jumps with parameters k (the shape) and
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x0 (the scale), with k > 2 in order to have a finite variance. The variance per trade is in that
case equal to:
σ2tr =
 x
2−k
0 (k−1)µk
k−2 if x0 ≤ µ
(k−1)µx0
k−2 if x0 ≥ µ.
To ensure that the variance per trade is proportional to the square of the spread we should
have x0 proportional to µ. Actually, to match the constants in both cases in the above
formulas, we naturally take x0 = µ. This means that at equilibrium the spread adapts to the
minimal jump size or rather that market participants view modifications of the efficient price
as significant only provided they are larger than half a spread. In this case, the variance per
trade becomes:
σ2tr =
k − 1
k − 2µ
2.
Knowing that the slope coefficient between the volatility per trade and the spread lies between
1 and 2, we expect a scale parameter k larger than 2.3. Note that when k tends to infinity,
the slope coefficient tends to 1. These results will be heavily used in Section 5.
3 The case of non-zero tick size
In this section, we study the effect of introducing a tick size, denoted by α, that constraints
the price levels in the LOB. The same efficient price dynamic as that described in the previous
section still applies, but the cumulative LOB shape becomes now a piecewise constant func-
tion. Due to price discreteness, the discontinuity points of L(x) will depend on the position
of the efficient price P (t) with respect to the tick grid.
3.1 Notations and assumptions
Notations To deal with the discontinuity points of L(x), the following notations will be
used in the sequel. Let us denote by P˜ (t) the smallest admissible price level that is greater
than or equal to the current efficient price P (t), and their distance by d := P˜ (t)−P (t), where
d ∈ [0, α). The cumulative LOB shape function L(x) is now defined by Ld(i):
Ld(i) =
{
L(d+ (i− 1)α) for i > 0
L(d+ iα) for i < 0.
(4)
The index i = 1 (resp. i = −1) corresponds to the closest price level that is larger (resp.
smaller) than or equal to P (t). When Ld(i) > 0 (resp. Ld(i) < 0), it represents the total
volume of sell (resp. buy) passive orders with prices smaller (resp. larger) than or equal to
the ith limit.
We write ld(i) for the quantity placed at the ith limit:
ld(i) =
{
Ld(i)− Ld(i− 1) for i > 0
Ld(i)− Ld(i+ 1) for i < 0.
When ld(i) > 0 (resp. ld(i) < 0), it represents the volume of sell (resp. buy) limit orders
placed at the ith limit. Recall that ld(i) ≥ 0 (resp. ld(i) ≤ 0) for i > 0 (resp. i < 0).
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Assumptions We adapt Assumption 1 to our tick size setting. We again assume that when
he receives new information, the informed trader sends his trades in a greedy way such that he
wipes out all the available liquidity at limits where the price is smaller than the new efficient
price. This can be translated as follows.
Assumption 3. When the informed trader sends a market order, then Qi is equal to Ld(i)
for some i ∈ Z∗. We have Qi = Ld(i) if and only if B ∈ [d+ (i− 1)α, d+ iα].
Remark 3.1. In practice, it is rare that a trade consumes more than one limit in the LOB.
Such trade in our model should be interpreted in practice as a sequence of transactions, each
of them consuming one limit.
3.2 Computation of the market makers expected gain
As in the previous section, let us compute the conditional average profit of a new infinitesimal
passive order submitted at the ith limit, knowing that Q > Ld(i), and without any information
about the trade’s initiator. This quantity is denoted by Gd(i) and defined in a similar fashion
as G(x) in Section 2.4. The computation of Gd(i) is comparable to that of G(x), and actually
even easier since we now have that the volume at the ith limit cannot be infinitesimal. This
means that different orders can be submitted at the same price with disparities in their gain
according to their position in the queue. For instance, the order placed on top of the queue has
the highest expected gain, while we will impose later that the gain of a new order submitted
at the rear of the queue is null. We have the following proposition proved in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumption 3, for i ∈ Z∗, the expected gain of a new infinitesimal
passive order placed at the ith level, given that it is executed, satisfies:
For i > 0:
Gd(i) = G(d+ (i− 1)α) = d+ (i− 1)α− rE[B1B>d+(i−1)α]
rP[B > d+ (i− 1)α] + (1− r)P[Qu > Ld(i)] ,
and for i < 0:
Gd(i) = G(d+ iα) = d+ iα− rE[B1B<d+iα]
rP[B < d+ iα] + (1− r)P[Qu < Ld(i)] .
The quantity Gd(i) can be understood as the expected gain of a newly inserted infinitesimal
limit order at the ith limit, under the condition that it is executed against some market order.
For this situation with non-zero tick size, we follow the same reasoning as in the case with
zero tick size. Indeed, for all i ∈ Z∗, market makers compute Lˆd(i) so that Gd(i) = 0 in
Proposition 3.1. The equality Gd(i) = 0 is equivalent to:
If i > 0:
d+ (i− 1)α = rE[B1B>d+(i−1)α]
rP[B > d+ (i− 1)α] + (1− r)P[Qu > Lˆd(i)]
and if i < 0:
d+ iα =
rE[B1B<d+iα]
rP[B < d+ iα] + (1− r)P[Qu < Lˆd(i)] .
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This is equivalent to:
Lˆd(i) =
{
F−1κu
(
1
1−r − r1−rE[max( Bd+(i−1)α , 1)]
)
if i > 0
F−1κu
( −r
1−r +
r
1−rE[max(
B
d+iα , 1)]
)
if i ≤ 0.
As in the case without tick size, this leads to the following zero-profit assumption.
Assumption 4. For every i ∈ Z+ (resp. i ∈ Z−), market makers compute Lˆd(i). If Lˆd(i) ≤ 0
(resp. Lˆd(i) ≥ 0), market makers add no liquidity to the LOB: Ld(i) = 0. If Lˆd(i) > 0 (resp.
Lˆd(i) < 0), because of competition, the cumulative order book adjusts so that Gd(i) = 0. We
then obtain then Ld(i) = Lˆd(i).
The zero-profit condition applies only to a new order submitted at the bottom of the queue.
The expected profit of the other orders is non-zero, maximum gain being obtained for the one
on top of the queue.
3.3 Bid-ask spread and LOB formation
Based on the expected gain of the market makers, see Proposition 3.1, and the zero-profit
condition (Assumption 4), as previously, we deduce the bid-ask spread and LOB shape. We
have the following theorem proved in Appendix A.5.
Theorem 3.1. The LOB shape function satisfies ld(i) = 0 for all −kdl < i < kdr , where kdl
and kdr are two positive integers determined by the following equations:
kdr = 1 + d
µ− d
α
e, kdl = d
µ+ d
α
e,
with µ defined by (1), and where dxe denotes the smallest integer that is larger than x (which
can be equal to 0). Furthermore, for i ≥ kdr :
Ld(i) = F−1κu
( 1
1− r −
r
1− rE[max(
B
d+ (i− 1)α, 1)]
)
and for i ≤ −kdl :
Ld(i) = F−1κu (
−r
1− r +
r
1− rE[max(
B
d+ iα
, 1)]).
For given d, the bid-ask spread φdα satisfies:
φdα = α
(dµ− d
α
e+ dµ+ d
α
e).
Let us consider the approximation that d is uniformly distributed on [0, α] (which is reason-
able, see [21, 29, 32]). In this case, we obtain the following corollary proved in Appendix
A.6.
Corollary 3.1. The average spread φα satisfies:
φα = 2µ+ α. (5)
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When the tick size is vanishing, we have seen in Theorem 2.1 that the spread is equal to
2µ. When it is not, the spread cannot necessarily be equal to 2µ because of the tick size
constraint. What is particularly interesting is that even if α ≤ 2µ, the equilibrium spread
is not 2µ. There is always a tick size processing cost leading to a spread value of 2µ + α.
Equation (5) will be used for practical applications in Section 4.
One numerical example of a limit order book For illustration, we provide now one
numerical example of a limit order book. As suggested in Section 2.6, let us consider that
the absolute value of the price jumps follows a Pareto distribution with shape and scale
parameters respectively equal to 3 and 0.005, r = 2/3, α = 0.01 and d = 0.0075. Moreover,
we suppose that Qu follows a standard normal distribution (here the value 1 of the standard
deviation just represents a suitable unity). Under the considered parameters, the spread is
equal to 2 ticks and we obtain the LOB given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Numerical illustration of a LOB.
3.4 Variance per trade
We provide here the variance per trade (defined previously in Section 2.6) in the case where
the tick size is non null. This result is obtained in a similar way as Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 3.2. The variance per trade σ2tr satisfies:
σ2tr = E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2] =
E[B2](µ+ α/2)
E[|B|1|B|>µ+α/2]
. (6)
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As in the zero tick size case (see Section 2.6), we consider that the absolute value of the
price jumps follows a Pareto distribution and take x0 equal to the half spread µ+ α/2. The
variance per trade becomes:
σ2tr =
k − 1
k − 2(µ+ α/2)
2.
We will estimate the scale parameter k from this relationship in Section 5.
3.5 Queue position valuation
Introducing a tick size in our modeling enables us to study the value of the position of the
limit orders in the queues. We can quantify the advantage of an order placed on top of a queue
compared to another one placed at the bottom. The difference in the values of the positions in
a queue is a crucial parameter for trading algorithms. It has actually lead to a technological
arms race among high-frequency traders and other automated market participants to estab-
lish early (and hence advantageous) positions in the queues, see [2, 27]. Placing limit orders
at the front of a queue is very valuable for different reasons. It guarantees early execution
and less waiting time. In addition, it reduces adverse selection risk. In fact, as explained in
[27], when a limit order is placed at the end of a queue, it is likely that it will be executed
against a large trade. In contrast, a limit order placed at the front of the (best) queue will be
executed against the next trade independently of the trade size. Large trades are in general
sent by informed traders aiming at consuming all limit orders which will generate profit for
them. In this way, a limit order submitted at the front of the queue is less likely to undergo
adverse selection.
In light of this, to optimize their execution, practitioners need to place limit orders in a rele-
vant way. This requires an estimate of the value of a limit order according to its position in
the queue. This very problem is studied in [27] for the queues at the best limits for large tick
assets. We complement here this nice work providing formulas valid for any queue of a large
or small tick asset and taking into account strategic interactions between market participants.
Assumption 4 tells us that the expected profit of a new infinitesimal limit order placed at
the bottom of a non-empty queue is equal to zero. However, under our zero-profit condition,
market makers may still make profit if their orders are placed before. The value of queue
position at the ith level, denoted by G˜d(i), can be formulated in this model as the difference
between the expected profit of the order placed on top and that of a new one that would be
placed at the bottom of the ith queue. Computing this quantity is very similar to deriving
the equations in Proposition 3.1. The difference is that now we no longer consider a traded
volume totally depleting the limit but a traded volume consuming all the limits before the
ith one. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. For i ≥ kdr , we have
G˜d(i) = d+ (i− 1)α− rE[B1B>d+(i−1)α]
1− rFψ(d+ (i− 1)α)− (1− r)Fκu
(
Ld(i− 1)) .
The formula for i ≤ −kdl is obviously deduced. We will confront the formula in Theorem 3.3
to data in Section 5.
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4 First practical application: Spread forecasting
Our model (in particular Equation (5)) allows us to forecast the new value of the spread if
the tick size is modified. In the following, we predict the spread changes due to the new tick
size regime under the recent European regulation MiFID II, and compare our results to the
effective spread values. We expect our model to be relevant for rather liquid assets since it is
based on the presence of competitive market makers. We therefore restrict ourselves to this
class. Note that there are other models in the literature enabling practitioners to forecast
spreads, see notably [9] where the authors propose an approach designed for large tick assets.
This methodology is applied for example in [18] on Japanese data and in [24] where spread
values before and after MiFID II are compared. The advantage of our device is that it can
be applied on both small and large tick assets.
4.1 The tick size issue and MiFID II regulation
In the recent years, trading platforms have raced to reduce their tick sizes in order to offer
better prices and gain market share. This broad trend has had adverse effects on the overall
market quality: a too small tick leads to unstable LOBs and a degradation of the price for-
mation mechanism. However, a too large tick prevents the price from moving freely according
to the views of market participants. Therefore, finding suitable tick values is crucial for the
fluidity of financial markets. To solve this issue, some regulators tried to use pilot programs,
as was the case in Japan and in the United States, see for example [18]. This is a costly prac-
tice which does not really rely on theoretical foundations. We believe that using quantitative
results such as those presented in this work could lead to a much more efficient methodology.
In Europe, MiFID II (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II) regulation introduced
a harmonized tick size regime (Article 49) which is based on a two-entries table: price and
liquidity (expressed in terms of number of transactions per day). Note that one of the targets
for regulators was to obtain for liquid assets spreads between 1.5 and 2 ticks, see [3].
4.2 Data
Our data are provided by the French regulator Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers. We study
the CAC 40 stocks over a six months time period around the implementation of MiFID II:
from October 2017 to December 2017 (before the tick size changes) and from January 2018 to
March 2018 (after the tick size changes). We consider assets whose tick size has changed after
the implementation of MiFID II regulation3. There are 14 stocks from the CAC 40 index
then remaining. We note that for all these assets, the tick size was increased.
For each asset we compute two spreads: the first one is averaged over all events occurring in
the LOB (transactions, insertions of a new order, cancellations or modifications of an existing
order) over the three months before MiFID II and the second one over the three months under
MiFID II.
3We exclude three assets whose tick size fluctuates intraday because of price variations.
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Stock Tick
size
before
MiF. II
Tick
size
under
MiF. II
Average
spread
before
MiF. II
(euros)
Average
spread
before
MiF. II
(ticks)
Average
spread
under
MiF. II
(euros)
Average
spread
under
MiF. II
(ticks)
Expected
spread
based
on our
model
Relative
error
Safran 0.01 0.02 0.019 1.892 0.031 1.556 0.029 7%
Accor 0.005 0.01 0.011 2.266 0.016 1.586 0.016 3%
Bouygues 0.005 0.01 0.011 2.277 0.017 1.734 0.016 5%
Kering 0.05 0.1 0.090 1.797 0.141 1.407 0.140 1%
Schneider Electric 0.01 0.02 0.016 1.579 0.025 1.235 0.026 4%
Veolia Environnement 0.005 0.01 0.007 1.440 0.012 1.189 0.012 3%
Vinci 0.01 0.02 0.017 1.668 0.026 1.280 0.027 4%
Vivendi 0.005 0.01 0.007 1.408 0.012 1.162 0.012 4%
Publicis 0.01 0.02 0.019 1.904 0.030 1.520 0.029 4%
Legrand 0.01 0.02 0.016 1.643 0.029 1.471 0.026 10%
Valeo 0.01 0.02 0.018 1.845 0.031 1.568 0.028 10%
TechnipFMC 0.005 0.01 0.010 2.056 0.017 1.677 0.015 10%
Table 1: Forecasting CAC 40 assets spreads under MiFID II.
4.3 Prediction of the spread under MiFID II and optimal tick sizes
We now forecast the new spreads of our 14 assets due to the new tick size regime, based on
pre-MiFID II data. We use two different predictors. First, we consider that the spread (in
euros) remains constant. Second, we compute the new value of the spread based on Equation
(5), with µ estimated on the period from October 2017 to December 2017. We compare the
accuracy of our forecasts with respect to the effective spread values in Table 1.
The forecasts based on our model are very accurate: the average relative error is equal to
5% while it is 43% for the other predictor. Remark also that the errors obtained under our
methodology are always smaller than the initial tick size, which is almost never the case if
one just assumes that the spread in euros is constant.
5 Second practical application: Queue position valuation
As we have seen in Section 3.5, our approach enables us to measure quantitatively the value
of queue position thanks to Theorem 3.3. To use this result, we need to know the distribution
of B. To estimate it, we use the Pareto parametrization of Section 3.4. We will estimate the
parameter k from Equation (6) and compute r using Equation (1). Values of queue positions
will then be deduced.
5.1 Data
To complement the results of [27], we consider in this section the values of queue position for
all small tick stocks of the CAC 40 index (that is stocks for which the average spread is larger
than 2 ticks). We study this quantity under MiFID II. These assets are investigated over a
three months period: from January 2018 to March 2018. This leaves us with five stocks. We
compute on a daily basis the average spread over all events occurring in the LOB and the
variance per trade, for each stock.
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5.2 Pareto parameters estimation methodology
Under our parametrization, the variance per trade is given by
σ2tr =
(k − 1)(µ+ α/2)2
k − 2 .
We estimate k by minimizing for each stock the quadratic error:∑
j
(
σ2tr − (σ˜2tr)j
)2
,
where σ2tr is the variance per trade obtained in our model and (σ˜
2
tr)j is the variance per trade
measured on data (realized variance based on 5 minutes price sampling divided by number
of trades) on day j. We search for the optimal k between 2.001 and 20. Note that for each
stock, the considered spread is equal to the average realized spread during the period under
study.
5.3 Queue position valuation
We first report in Table 2 the values of the queue position at the best ask limit according to
d. We consider that d can be equal to 0.25α, 0.5α or 0.75α.
Stock Spread
(euros)
Spread
(ticks)
k r Priority
value
for d =
0.25α
(euros)
Priority
value
for d =
0.25α
(spreads)
Priority
value
for d =
0.5α
(euros)
Priority
value
for d =
0.5α
(spreads)
Priority
value
for d =
0.75α
(euros)
Priority
value
for d =
0.75α
(spreads)
Renault 0.025 2.476 2.866 65% 0.010 41% 0.011 45% 0.012 50%
Lafarge Holcim 0.026 2.438 3.316 70% 0.010 39% 0.011 42 % 0.012 48%
Airbus 0.020 2.040 3.478 71% 0.011 53% 0.012 61% 0.014 68%
Saint-Gobain 0.010 2.035 4.776 79% 0.006 55% 0.007 65% 0.008 76%
Socie´te´ Generale 0.010 2.012 9.910 90% 0.006 60% 0.007 73% 0.009 86%
Table 2: Queue position values at the best ask according to d.
We see that the values of queue position are of the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask
spreads. This is in line with the findings in [27]. In addition, we get that it is increasing with
d. Furthermore, remark that as expected from Section 2.6, the values of k are larger than
2.3.
We now compute in Table 3 the values of queue position at the four best limits when d = 0.5α.
Stock Spread
(euros)
Spread
(ticks)
k r First
limit
priority
value
(euros)
First
limit
priority
value
(spreads)
Second
limit
priority
value
(euros)
Second
limit
priority
value
(spreads)
Third
limit
priority
value
(euros)
Third
limit
priority
value
(spreads)
Fourth
limit
priority
value
(euros)
Fourth
limit
priority
value
(spreads)
Renault 0.025 2.476 2.866 65% -0.007 -30% 0.011 45% 0.013 54% 0.013 51%
Lafarge Holcim 0.026 2.438 3.316 70% -0.008 -31% 0.011 42 % 0.014 55% 0.013 52%
Airbus 0.020 2.040 3.478 71% -0.005 -25% 0.012 61% 0.015 72% 0.014 67%
Saint-Gobain 0.010 2.035 4.776 79% -0.003 -25% 0.007 65% 0.009 84% 0.008 78%
Socie´te´ Generale 0.010 2.012 9.910 90% -0.003 -25% 0.007 73% 0.012 117% 0.013 127%
Table 3: Queue position values at the four best limits for d = 0.5α.
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Note that the queue position value of the first limit does not necessarily correspond to the best
ask. For example, if the priority value at the first limit is negative and the one at the second
limit is positive, the best ask is the second limit. We observe that the value of queue position
is increasing according to the rank of the limit, up to some level after which it decreases.
Conclusion
In this article, we introduce an agent-based model for the LOB. Inspired by the seminal paper
by Glosten and Milgrom [11], we use a zero-profit condition for the market makers which en-
ables us to derive a link between proportion of events due to the noise trader, bid-ask spread,
dynamic of the efficient price and equilibrium LOB state. The effect of introducing a tick
size is then discussed. We in particular show that the constrained bid-ask spread is equal to
the sum of the tick value and the intrinsic bid-ask spread that corresponds to the case of a
vanishing tick size. This model allows us to do spread forecasting when one modifies the tick
size. Price discreteness also enables us to value queue positions in the LOB.
In our approach, market makers only are allowed to insert limit orders. In practice, the roles
of informed trader and market makers are often mixed, and the informed trader also has the
possibility to place passive limit orders. By doing so, he may get better prices but also leak
some information to other market participants. Extending our model by taking into account
accurately these intricate features is left for future work.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
We consider the gain of passive sell orders. The gain of passive buy orders can be easily
deduced.
First, we compute Ginf (x− δp, x). We have:
Ginf (x− δp, x) =
∫ x
x−δp
(P (t) + s)dL˜(s)−
∫ x
x−δp
(P (t) + E[B|B > x])dL˜(s)
=
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s)− L˜(x)E[B|B > x].
For Gnoise(x− δp, x) we get:
Gnoise(x− δp, x) =
∫ x
x−δp
(P (t) + s)dL˜(s)−
∫ x
x−δp
P (t)dL˜(s) =
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s).
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We deduce that:
G(x− δp, x) = Ginf (x− δp, x)P[ν = 1|Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)] +Gnoise(x− δp, x)P[ν = 0|Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)]
=
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s)− P[ν = 1|Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)]L˜(x)E[B|B > x]
=
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s)− L˜(x)E[B|B > x] rP[B > x]
P[Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)]
=
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s)− L˜(x) rE[B1B>x]
P[Q ≥ L(x) + L˜(x)]
=
∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s)− L˜(x) rE[B1B>x]
rP[B > x] + (1− r)P[Qu > L(x) + L˜(x)] .
Integrating by part we get∫ x
x−δp
sdL˜(s) = L˜(x)x−
∫ x
x−δp
L˜(s)ds = εx−
∫ x
x−δp
L˜(s)ds.
When δp tends to 0, this tends to εx. Consequently, we have:
lim
δp→0
G(x− δp, x) = ε(x− rE[B1B>x]
rP[B > x] + (1− r)P[Qu > L(x) + L˜(x)]
)
,
and
G(x) = lim
ε→0
(
lim
δp→0
G(x− δp, x)
ε
)
= x− rE[B1B>x]
rP[B > x] + (1− r)P[Qu > L(x)] .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We consider the passive sell orders (x > 0). We first compute Lˆ(x) which is the theoretical
liquidity that market makers should add in the LOB in order to obtain G(x) = 0. Under
Proposition 2.1, G(x) = 0 is equivalent to:
P[Qu > L(x)] =
r
1− r
(
E[
B
x
1B>x]− P[B > x]
)
=
r
1− r
(
E[
B
x
1B>x]− 1 + P[B < x]
)
=
r
1− r
(− 1 + E[max(B
x
, 1)]
)
.
We deduce that
Lˆ(x) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− rE[max(
B
x
, 1)]).
We now prove that the spread is positive and finite and deduce the shape of the whole LOB.
Recall that Lˆ(x) computed above is a theoretical value, and that market makers will add
liquidity only when Lˆ(x) > 0.
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We have Lˆ(x) > 0 when ( 11−r − r1−rE[max(Bx , 1)]) > 12 . This holds for all x such that
E[max(Bx , 1)] <
1+r
2r . Equivalently, the inequality is satisfied for any x such that x > µ, where
µ is unique solution of the following equation:
E[max(
B
µ
, 1)] =
1 + r
2r
.
By Assumption 2, we deduce that for any x ≤ µ, L(x) = 0. Moreover, for any x > µ,
L(x) = F−1κu
( 1
1− r −
r
1− rE[max(
B
x
, 1)]
)
.
We deduce that µ is the half spread.
The cumulative LOB we obtain is unique, continuous and strictly increasing beyond the
spread (since the laws of B and Qu have positive densities on R).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
We denote by νi the random variable that is equal to 1 if the i
th trade is initiated by the
informed trader and 0 if it is initiated by the noise trader. We write ω for the number of
events4 between two successive trades. We have:
σ2tr = E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2] =
∞∑
j=1
P[ω = j]E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j].
with
E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j] = P[ντi+1 = 0|ω = j]E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j, ντi+1 = 0]
+ P[ντi+1 = 1|ω = j]E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j, ντi+1 = 1].
Knowing that ω = j, the jth event can be a trade initiated by the noise trader or a trade
initiated by the informed trader. We have
E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j, ντi+1 = 1] = E[(
j−1∑
k=1
Bk +Bj)
2||Bk| < µ, |Bj | > µ]
= (j − 1)E[B2k||Bk| < µ] + E[B2j ||Bj | > µ].
and
E[(Pτi+1 − Pτi)2|ω = j, ντi+1 = 0] = E[(
j−1∑
k=1
Bk)
2||Bk| < µ] = (j − 1)E[B2k||Bk| < µ].
We compute the probabilities:
4An event can be either a trade sent by the noise trader (in that case it necessarily triggers a new trans-
action), or an information update B which may or may not trigger a trade, depending on whether or not
|B| > µ.
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P[ντi+1 = 1|ω = j] =
rP[|B| > µ]
1− rP[|B| < µ]
and
P[ντi+1 = 0|ω = j] =
1− r
1− rP[|B| < µ] .
Consequently,
σ2tr = E[B2||B| ≤ µ]
∞∑
j=1
(j − 1)P[ω = j] + E[B2||B| > µ] rP[|B| > µ]
1− rP[|B| < µ] .
We have:
∞∑
j=1
P[ω = j](j − 1) = (1− rP[|B| < µ])
∞∑
j=1
(j − 1)(rP[|B| < µ])j−1
= (1− rP[|B| < µ])
∞∑
j=0
j(rP[|B| < µ])j
=
rP[|B| < µ](
1− rP[|B| < µ]) .
We deduce:
σ2tr =
rE[B21|B|<µ] + rE[B21|B|>µ]
1− rP[|B| ≤ µ] =
rE[B2]
1− rP[|B| ≤ µ] .
Recall that from Equation (1) :
1 + r
2r
= E[max(
B
µ
, 1)] = E[
B
µ
1B>µ] + P[B ≤ µ].
this implies that
1 + r
r
− 1 = E
[ |B|
µ
1|B|>µ
]
+ P[|B| ≤ µ].
Thus we conclude that
σ2tr =
E[B2]µ
E[|B|1|B|>µ]
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We just give a sketch of proof here since the computations are essentially the same as for the
proof of Proposition 2.1. In particular, we do not introduce the volume ε of limit orders and
directly work in the asymptotic regime ε tending to zero. We consider the gain of passive sell
orders. The gain of passive buy orders can be deduced the way.
First, we compute the gain of a new order placed at the ith limit when the trade is initiated
by an informed trader, knowing that Qi > Ld(i), denoted by Gdinf (i):
Gdinf (i) = d+ (i− 1)α− E[B|B > d+ (i− 1)α].
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Second, we compute the gain of a new order placed at the ith limit when the trade is initiated
by a noise trade, knowing that Qi > Ld(i), denoted by Gdnoise(i):
Gdnoise(i) = d+ (i− 1)α.
Now, Gd(i) satisfies:
Gd(i) = Gdinf (i)P[ν = 1|Q > Ld(i)] +Gdnoise(i)P[ν = 0|Q > Ld(i)]
= d+ (i− 1)α− rE[B1B>d+(i−1)α]
P[Q > L(d+ (i− 1)α])
= d+ (i− 1)α− rE[B1B>d+(i−1)α]
rP[B > d+ (i− 1)α] + (1− r)P[Qu > L(d+ (i− 1)α)] .
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We consider the ask side. First we show that the spread is positive and finite. Then we prove
that beyond the spread, market makers insert limit orders on all possible limit prices.
We showed in the case where the tick size is null that there exists µ such that for all x ≤
µ,L(x) = 0 and for all x > µ,L(x) > 0. The LOB being now discrete, the previous findings
remain true for kdr instead of µ where k
d
r satisfies:
kdr = min{k ∈ N+|d+ (k − 1)α > µ}.
So we have:
kdr = 1 + d
µ− d
α
e.
Similarly, for the first non-empty limit at the bid side, we get:
kdl = d
µ+ d
α
e.
From Equation (4), the spread is equal to (kdr + k
d
l )α− α. Thus the conditional constrained
bid-ask spread φdα, given the value of d, satisfies:
φdα = α(d
µ− d
α
e+ dµ+ d
α
e).
Under Assumption 4, we have for any i ≥ kdr :
L(d+ (i− 1)α) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− rE[max(
B
d+ (i− 1)α, 1)]).
We deduce that the cumulative LOB is unique and increasing beyond the spread.
23
A.6 Proof of Corollary 3.1
The parameter d being approximately uniformly distributed between [0, α), we can compute
the average value of the constrained bid-ask spread by integrating φdα:
φα =
∫ α
0
dµ− s
α
e+ dµ+ s
α
eds.
Denote u := µα . We have:
φu = α
∫ 1
0
du− xe+ du+ xedx.
We decompose u such that u = ui + uf , where ui represents the integer part of u. We get:
φα = α
∫ 1
0
dui + uf − xe+ dui + uf + xedx.
φα = α
( ∫ uf
0
(ui + 1)dx+
∫ 1
uf
uidx+
∫ 1−uf
0
(ui + 1)dx+
∫ 1
(1−uf )
(ui + 2)dx
)
.
φα = α
(
uf (ui + 1) + (1− uf )ui + (1− uf )(ui + 1) + uf (ui + 2)
)
.
φα = α(2ui + 2uf + 1) = α+ 2µ = α+ φ.
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